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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant, Eric Johnson, while represented by an Assistant Federal Public 
Defender (“AFPD”), Thomas Thornton, pled guilty to drug-related offenses on July 16, 
2013.  He later sought to withdraw his guilty plea, but that motion was denied.  He was 
sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment.  He now argues that his conviction should be 
overturned because of ineffective assistance of counsel.  For the reasons discussed below, 
we will affirm the conviction and sentence. 
I 
 The operative charging document was a superseding information that charged 
Johnson with one count of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine between April, 2012, 
and June 8, 2012, but did not specify the quantity of drugs or the specific conduct at 
issue.  The earlier indictment contained four counts and alleged offenses involving “at 
least 280 grams of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount” of crack 
cocaine, but did not specify the precise quantity or conduct at issue.  App. at 259.  At the 
change of plea hearing, AUSA William Behe referred to the plea as a “charge bargain 
plea agreement,” under which Johnson agreed to waive indictment and plead guilty to the 
superseding information.  App. at 246.  The benefit of this agreement to Johnson was that 
unlike the original indictment which contained four counts that “would have carried 
mandatory minimum terms of ten years with a maximum imprisonment up to life,” by 
pleading guilty to the superseding information, Johnson would “not face any mandatory 
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minimum term of imprisonment,” and his maximum sentence would be capped at 20 
years.  Id.  The plea agreement also included a recommendation of a three level reduction 
in offense level for acceptance of responsibility. 
 At the change of plea hearing held before Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson, the 
Government stated, based largely on statements Johnson had made at an earlier proffer 
interview, that it would have proven several facts at trial, specifically that Johnson had 
sold 135.5 grams of crack cocaine to a confidential source working for the Dauphin 
County Police during a controlled buy on June 8, 2012, and that police recovered an 
additional 797.8 grams of crack cocaine and a gun during a search of Johnson’s minivan.  
Judge Carlson asked, “Mr. Johnson, setting aside any of these issues of drug quantities, 
which I understand may be something the parties may be litigating, is that what happened 
here?”  App. at 255.  Johnson answered, “Yes.”  Id.  The Judge conducted a thorough 
colloquy to determine that Johnson’s plea was knowing and voluntary.  The colloquy 
included the following exchanges: 
The Court:  Have you seen a copy of that superseding 
information? 
The Defendant:  Yes. 
The Court:  Do you wish to have Mr. Behe [the Assistant U.S. 
Attorney] or Mr. Thornton read it out loud, or do you waive 
the reading of it out loud in court? 
The Defendant:  I will waive it. 
. . . 
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The Court:  And I take it, Mr. Behe, this case was previously 
indicted and this information may charge a lesser offense. 
[The Government]:  Yes.  This is essentially a charge bargain.  
It takes count four of the original indictment, which was 
returned in June of 2012, takes out any reference to drug 
amounts, so there is no mandatory minimum that applies.  But 
it’s essentially count four of the original indictment. 
The Court:  I understand.  And so we’re discussing this right 
to waive the indictment, although you have been previously 
indicted, Mr. Behe is representing to us, on charges of 
somewhat greater gravity.  But you understand you could 
insist upon an indictment? 
The Defendant:  Yes. 
The Court:  But as part of this plea agreement you are 
agreeing to waive indictment.  Is that correct? 
The Defendant:  Yes. 
. . . 
The Court:  . . . There is a plea agreement in this matter, 
and . . . [i]f you look at the last page there, there’s a signature 
on it.  Did you sign that agreement? 
The Defendant:  Yes. 
The Court:  And did you sign it after you and Mr. Thornton 
had a chance to go over each and every paragraph of the 
agreement? 
The Defendant:  Yes. 
The Court:  Do you feel like you had enough time to review 
the document before you signed it? 
The Defendant:  Yes. 
The Court:  And did you sign it voluntarily? 
The Defendant:  Yes. 
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App. at 241-43; 245-46.  The Government summarized the terms of the plea agreement 
on the record, including the mandatory minimum sentence and potential life sentence that 
the original indictment carried, and that by pleading guilty to the superseding information 
Johnson would not face any mandatory term of imprisonment and would face a 
maximum sentence of 20 years.  After that explanation, the colloquy continued: 
The Court:  Mr. Johnson, does that sound like the agreement 
you have with the [G]overnment? 
The Defendant:  Yes.   
The Court:  Other than the promises outlined in the plea 
agreement described by Mr. Behe here in court, has anyone 
promised you anything to get you to plead guilty here? 
The Defendant:  No. 
. . .  
The Court:  And do you understand that the statutory 
maximum penalty for this offense as outlined in the plea 
agreement is 20 years imprisonment[?] . . .  
The Defendant:  Yes. 
. . .  
The Court:  And have you and Mr. Thornton talked about 
those guidelines and how they might apply to your case? 
The Defendant:  Sort of, yes. 
 The Court:  . . . Has anyone estimated for you what those 
guidelines may be? 
The Defendant:  Not exactly. 
. . .  
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The Court:  If someone has estimated for you what the 
guidelines might be, that’s only their estimate and it’s not 
binding on the Court.  Do you understand that? 
The Defendant:  Yes. 
The Court: . . . But at the end of that process, if it turns out 
that the guidelines are different or higher than you expected, 
you will still be bound by this plea agreement.  Do you 
understand that? 
The Defendant:  Yes. 
App. at 247; 249-51. 
 After pleading guilty but before his sentencing, Johnson moved for appointment of 
new counsel, which the District Court granted.  Johnson moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea, claiming that his former counsel (Thornton) had been ineffective for failing to 
suppress evidence of all drug quantities other than that recovered during the controlled 
buy.  He also alleged that Thornton had promised him a sentence of 10-12 years, despite 
the statutory maximum for his charged offense being 20 years.  During his testimony, 
Johnson claimed he had lied to Judge Carlson when he stated that no promises had been 
made regarding his guideline range.  He also claimed he had lied to Judge Carlson when 
he stated that he had gone through every paragraph of the plea agreement with Thornton.  
Thornton testified that he did not promise Johnson any specific sentence, and that he read 
the entire plea agreement to Johnson.  Johnson and Thornton also testified about their 
discussion regarding the guidelines.  They agreed that Thornton discussed the guidelines 
to some extent, but Thornton testified that he did not provide any estimation of the 
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guidelines range while Johnson testified that Thornton did provide an inexact estimate of 
10-12 years.  The District Court denied Johnson’s motion to withdraw his plea. 
 At sentencing, the District Court considered the Presentence Investigation Report 
(“PSR”), in which Probation reported that the Government’s confidential source had 
given the DEA an additional 179.1 grams of crack cocaine that he claimed he bought 
from Johnson before the June 8, 2012 controlled buy.  Johnson testified, and denied 
having sold the additional 179.1 grams to the confidential source.  Furthermore, despite 
having admitted at his change of plea hearing that the minivan from which the police had 
recovered 797.8 grams of crack cocaine and a gun belonged to him, at sentencing 
Johnson claimed he had leased the minivan for a friend, and that he had no knowledge of 
or responsibility for the drugs and gun recovered from the minivan.  The District Court 
also heard testimony from the two officers involved with Johnson’s proffer interview and 
the controlled buy.  They stated that at the proffer interview, Johnson admitted that he 
knew about the drugs and the gun in the minivan, but claimed that they were not his.  
They stated that the amounts of crack cocaine Johnson had possessed and trafficked were 
much greater than the amounts involved with the controlled buy and recovered from the 
minivan, and that they had seen Johnson operate the minivan and have access to the 
minivan briefly before the buy. 
 After hearing the testimony at sentencing and reviewing the testimony from the 
change of plea hearing, the District Court found that Johnson’s testimony that he did not 
have a possessory interest in the minivan or know about the drugs in the minivan was not 
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credible.  The Court held that Johnson’s guidelines range should reflect the 135.5 grams 
of crack cocaine from the controlled buy and the 797.8 grams recovered from the 
minivan, as well as an enhancement for the gun that was also found in the minivan.  The 
Court did not make a determination about the additional 179.1 grams Johnson allegedly 
sold to the confidential source before the controlled buy, because that additional quantity 
would not have changed the guidelines range.  The Court sentenced Johnson to 200 
months in prison. 
 On appeal, Johnson argues that his conviction should be overturned because of 
ineffective assistance of counsel by his original attorney, AFPD Thornton.1  He claims 
that he believed he was only pleading guilty to conspiracy to sell the 135.5 grams of 
crack cocaine from the controlled buy, and that pleading to that offense would have 
resulted in a guideline sentence between 110 and 137 months, rather than the 200 months 
he received.  Therefore, Johnson claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
move to suppress the additional crack cocaine that the confidential source turned over 
and the evidence seized from the minivan.  Johnson argues these failures were denials of 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Johnson also claims that AFPD Thornton was 
ineffective because he advised Johnson to accept the proposed guilty plea because he was 
                                              
1  We note that Johnson’s appellate brief is written entirely in underlined, bold font, 
in contravention of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(6).  Counsel is advised 
that bold text should be reserved for adding emphasis. 
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afraid that Johnson would receive a sentence greater than twenty years, despite the fact 
that the statutory maximum for the charged offense was twenty years. 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Whether we construe this appeal as an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim (as Johnson argues) or a challenge to the District Court’s denial of 
Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea (as the Government suggests), Johnson 
cannot prevail.   
A. Ineffective assistance claims 
 The Government urges us not to consider Johnson’s ineffective assistance claims 
because “[c]laims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally are not entertained on 
direct appeal.”  United States v. Haywood, 155 F.3d 674, 678 (3d Cir. 1998).  “There is, 
however, a narrow exception to the rule that defendants cannot attack the efficacy of their 
counsel on direct appeal.  Where the record is sufficient to allow a determination of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, an evidentiary hearing to develop the facts is not 
needed.”  United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991).  We find that the 
record here is sufficient to decide the issue of AFPD Thornton’s effectiveness because 
the District Court explored the issues Johnson raises on appeal at the hearing on 
Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Both Johnson and Thornton testified at 
that hearing.  “We exercise plenary review over the legal component of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  We review the underlying facts for clear error, but exercise 
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independent judgment on whether those facts, as found by the District Court, show that 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance.”  United States v. Davenport, 775 F.3d 605, 608 
(3d Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). 
 A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea based on ineffective counsel “only if (1) 
the defendant shows that his attorney’s advice was under all the circumstances 
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, [and that (2)] he suffered ‘sufficient 
prejudice’ from his counsel’s errors.”  United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 253-54 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).  Thornton appears to have done a sufficient job on 
Johnson’s behalf.  He negotiated a plea based on the superseding information, which 
carried no minimum sentence and a significantly lower maximum sentence than Johnson 
may have faced under the original indictment.  Johnson’s argument that Thornton’s 
concerns about him receiving a higher sentence than the maximum sentence allowable 
under the superseding information is misplaced.  The basis of the plea deal was to secure 
the superseding information itself, which significantly lowered the possible penalties 
Johnson could have faced.  Johnson has presented no credible evidence suggesting that a 
motion to suppress the additional drugs and gun could have succeeded.  Indeed, the 
District Court found that at least 933.3 grams were attributable to Johnson, a factual 
determination that the record supports and which we will not disturb.  Thus, Thornton’s 
conduct does not appear to have been unreasonable, and we will not vacate Johnson’s 
conviction on ineffective assistance grounds. 
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B. Motion to withdraw guilty plea 
 Analyzing this appeal as a challenge to the District Court’s denial of Johnson’s 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea renders the same result.  “A defendant may withdraw 
a plea of guilty . . . after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if . . . 
the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B).  When evaluating a motion to withdraw, a district court must 
consider “(1) whether the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the strength of the 
defendant’s reasons for withdrawing the plea; and (3) whether the government would be 
prejudiced by the withdrawal.”  Jones, 336 F.3d at 252.  We review the District Court’s 
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1986).  
 The District Court found Johnson’s testimony as to his reasons for withdrawing 
his guilty plea not to be credible.  Given that Johnson’s testimony was at odds with his 
own prior statements, and that he admitted to lying extensively under oath at his change 
of plea hearing, we agree.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
III 
 For the reasons discussed, we will affirm. 
 
